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IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENCE -TECHNOLOGY
FOR LEGAL PROCESS

SUMMARY
By ROBERT B. YEGGE

T

WO assumptions have been implicit during this conference: 1) that
there is a need for external monitoring of science and technology
and 2) that the law should play some role in that enterprise.
For a number of reasons, both the judicial and the legislative
branches of the law have failed to provide the necessary surveillance;
and administrative agencies, as they are now structured, have also been
unable to do the job. (Some participants, in any event, expressed
considerable misgivings about overreliance on administrative agencies.)
We agreed that there is now no adequate "early warning system" to
alert us to unanticipated legal consequences of advances in science and
technology.
During these discussions, science has been characterized as a poser
of questions and the law as a source of solutions. Traditionally, it has
been true that scientists and law men do different things and serve
different clients. Today, however, the boundaries are less clearcut.
As the sociologists have told us, all things are interrelated, albeit some
more closely than others. We are in an age of rapid and extensive
change, affecting every level of the community, and it is now incumbent
on all of us, particularly those of us in the law and the social and
physical sciences, to concern ourselves with our future as well as to
contemplate our past.
This conference has focused on law- not on science and technology. The center of our attention has been the role of law and its
administrators in the process of making decisions about our use of the
findings of science and the products of technology. We have been
concerned with the problem of how the law, as a formal institution
of social control, can best serve as an effective vehicle for assessment
and control of developments in science-technology.
Since the specific charge before the conference had to do with
legal education, we posed the question: How can the law school meet
the challenges of training people who will be called on to make legally
based decisions about scientific and technological innovations? A number of interesting general observations were made during these meetings,
but I shall limit this summary to those matters which seem to me to be
related to the specific question.
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When we directed our attention to law schools, several ancillary
questions arose:
(1) What law schools are we talking about?
First of all, is the law school the proper place in which to pursue
techno-legal problems? (Indeed, is any existing academic unit the
proper location for this kind of activity?) If we assume that law
schools do provide an appropriate base, do we then assume that all
of them are equally well equipped to make the effort? Participants
pointed out that there are political and ideological differences, as well
as qualitative differences, among law schools and that such differences
argue against an across-the-board effort on the part of all institutions
of legal education. Programs in science-technology-law, then, at least
initially, should be developed at a limited number of law schools.
(2) What faculty would be involved?
Higher education and professional education today are not overpopulated with multidisciplinarians. Finding the proper mix of interests and skills for the assessment of science and technology, or teaching
in a science-technology-law program is often, if not always, difficult.
The actuarial likelihood of instant access to the necessary interests and
skills within a particular faculty is very low.
As Chairman Young pointed out, the value systems of people in
different disciplines can be a barrier to successful interdisciplinary
programs. In addition, there are serious institutional pressures inherent
in higher education generally, which hinder the development of multidisciplinary teachers - e.g., while senior scholars may be secure enough
to step across disciplinary boundaries, junior faculty members are frequently anxious to make their reputations in their own fields and
reluctant to deviate from what is accepted by their disciplinary peers.
The academic world, unfortunately, seldom offers peer recognition for
extra-disciplinary accomplishments.
(3) What curriculum would be suited to the task?
We examined a number of possible curricular goals. The law
school need not, of course, concern itself with training scientists and
engineers. But legal education should strive, in dealing with the problems of science and technology, to produce lawyers who recognize their
lack of expertise in those areas and who are prepared to work with
experts in the processes of decisionmaking and assessment. Obviously,
a basic understanding of scientific methodology will be of great value
to future lawyers. But it is essential that they also be aware of their
need to consult with scientists and engineers in assessing the consequences of scientific investigation and technological innovations. (One
suggestion made on this point was that a kind of technological sensi-
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tivity training be provided in the legal curriculum, so that the student
would develop an automatic skepticism and a habit of investigation
in making assessments.)
Traditional course offerings of law schools already cover some
of the clearer interrelations of law and science-technology: patent law,
natural resources, and international law. The content of many of
those courses may be viewed with suspicion by the scientist or technologist, but, at least, legal education has recognized that the relationship exists.
Like science, law has many facets- law making, interpretation
of the law, legal reform, and, for the so-called practicing lawyer,
avoidance of the law. The subject matter of these procedures cover
the gamut of human problems. If law schools are to attack the issue
of the implications of science-technology, for legal process, they must
first determine which processes, in what order of priority, will get
systematic attention. So there are choices to be made before the curricular goals of any particular law school can be drawn up.
One caveat was noted: It would be easy for the upcoming generation of law-trained people to overreact and overparticipate in the
management and assessment of technology. The resulting "legal overkill" could have as disastrous an effect as current legal indifference.
(4) What students would be involved in the new programs?
There has been widespread agreement on the fact that today's
law student is substantially different from his predecessors, who are
now in practice. In past years, the Phi Beta Kappas were attracted
to the scientific disciplines and the law schools got the "Gentlemen
C's." But, today we are benefiting from an awakened interest in the
law among the most intelligent of the college generation -young
men and women deeply aware of, and concerned about, democratic
principles.
The new law students recognize the inevitability of change without
a concurrent fear of the unsettling effects change has on old habits
and expectations. They have an explicit awareness of the persistent
ills and imperfections in American society. They are not naively indifferent to the educational enterprise or its relation to the serious goal
of attaining justice.
In view of the recent and projected burgeoning of scientific
inquiry and technological advances, it becomes extremely important
that the scientific ethos is made a part of legal education so that
developments in this area will be seen as challenges rather than as
frightening or inconsequential events.
It was suggested that no matter how we train law students they
will pursue careers randomly, not systematically. But this view over-
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looks the fact that there is specialization in legal practice (despite the
protestations of the American Bar Association) and today's students
are pursuing specialties, sometimes regardless of financial reward.
(5) What legal careers would be involved?
To give any new program a chance of survival, there must be
career objectives that students can perceive. The folk notion that all
law graduates will enter general practice in, say, a two-man firm in
Lamar, Colorado, is patently false. Lawyers do many and diverse
things and there is a serious question whether what we are now teaching
in our law schools is relevant to the things our graduates actually do.
The fact of the matter is that there are career opportunities in government, industry, legal education, and even law firms (yes, even in
Lamar) that require some acquaintance with the implications of
science and technology for legal process.
In a variety of legal roles, lawyers advise the justice-consuming
public on matters concerned with the monitoring and management of
science and technology. Judges are lawyers, and when the courts are
called upon to protect us against technological assault, they have a
specific mediating role in the assessment of technology. The administrative agencies of government are acutely aware of law, either because
the administrators are lawyers or because they constantly consult lawyers. Legislators and their assistants and advisors are predominantly
lawyers and the information they have about science and technology
is critical to legislative action.
I share Professor Jones's concern that the role of the legal process
and concomitantly the role of the law school - in the assessment
of science and technology, was not clarified more systematically at this
conference.
It has been suggested that the traditional approach of legal
education - deductive reasoning, rule orientation, syllogistic thinking
- is not conducive to the development of programs in sciencetec inology-law. Instead, we must find a new approach, and our first
step should be a careful definition of the problems and prospective
problems precipitated by science and technology.
It also seems desirable that law students be taught (and that
legal process recognize) that complex social problems cannot be
solved by any single solution. The differential values of individuals
and groups affected by the wonders of technology must be taken into
account. It is even possible that the law- which is thought to be the
embodiment of prevailing social values- should face the fact that
it is often arational, though not necessarily irrational.
-
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Many of our speakers and discussants have noted that the problem
approach has recently gained favor in some law schools. On one level,
this teaching method is in stark contrast to the Langdellian, appellate
case-analysis method that has been the exclusive tool of legal education
for some time. The problem approach involves a systematic definition
of a problem (from more than the legal perspective), followed by an
exploration and appraisal of alternative solutions and their consequences. Further sophistication in using this teaching method leads to
a clinical experience in assessing a real problem resulting from the
introduction of a new technological advance and seeking remedies for it.
Advocacy is, and will rightfully continue to be, important in the
assessment function of the law. But we need to know more precisely
what the role of advocacy is and how we can most effectively train
future advocates to use it wisely in the process of assessment. Perhaps
this challenge should engage the first efforts of law schools - an
area in which we have some professed, if not real, expertise.
It has been suggested that the products of technology may be
useful in teaching law and legal process, analyzing individual and
societal legal problems, and finding alternative proposals for reform.
However, the use of systems analysis, for example employing elaborate
computer hardware, should not serve as a wholesale replacement of
the case-study method of teaching or we risk repeating the same fallacy
of a monolithic approach to legal education that we have suffered
from in the past.
It was also suggested that law schools should redesign their
curriculums totally -away
from training in the techniques of legal
manipulation and toward training in policy analysis. (This approach
could, it was pointed out, coexist with traditional training.) The
development of policy-analysis centers would necessitate an environment somewhat different from that provided by the current lawschool structure. It would call for a flexibility that allows for relationships among interdisciplinary scholars through special allocation of
time, special inducements, proximity, effective coordination of efforts,
and independence.
Some members of the conference have differentiated between
the policy-analysis approach and the multidisciplinary approach, which
involves teaching, research, and clinical experience centered on a given
problem. I guess that the difference between the two is that the
former is exclusive and the latter would be pursued in conjunction
with the traditional legal curriculum, as is now being done at a few
law schools.
Finally, our discussions touched on that dirty subject, money
as any discussion of establishing new programs in legal education
must. From the point of view of the general university administration,
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law schools are "cheap" education: They require no expensive equipment other than books; they hold large classes run by a single professor;
there is a conspicuous absence of teaching and grading assistants, and
so on. To mount any innovative program and to sustain it requires
funds from outside the parent institution, at least until the law school
can demonstrate that the experiment has been successful and that the
program is basic to legal education.
Yet, unless there is some bold action by some law schools, even
in the face of these difficulties, the current indifference of the law
and its practitioners to the implications of scientific inquiry and
technological innovations will persist and legal curriculums will become
even more "irrelevant," to borrow from today's parlance. Possibly,
institutional timidity is at the root of most of the problems with legal
education today.
A great deal of what has been said at this conference can serve
as an agenda for the development of programs in science, technology,
and the law. Hopefully, this symposium issue of the Denver Law
Journal recounting our discussions will provide an introductory text
for this significant, emerging area of teaching, scholarship, and
community concern.

